


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
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JOINT WARFIGHTING AND THE 1986 REORGANIZATION ACT

LT COL JAMES G. HULSEY, JR, USMC

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JOINT WARFIGHTING AND THE 1986
REORGANIZATION ACT

by

James G. Hulsey, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Armstrong

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Joint Warfighting and the 1986 Reorganization Act

AUTHOR: James G. Hulsey, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the culmination of Congressional efforts to correct perceived organizational deficiencies within the Department of Defense. Congressional concern had grown from a series of operational problems highlighted in such places as Vietnam, Iran (Desert One), Lebanon, and Grenada.

This paper traces organizational developments in the defense establishment since World War II to identify specific areas of continuing concern that convinced political leaders of the necessity to legislate changes to correct perceived deficiencies. The major provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1986 are examined in an effort to determine if the changes will effectively correct identified problems and lead to a more coordinated force on the battlefield. Specific changes with the potential to directly affect joint warfighting capabilities are examined and recommendations to better achieve the intentions of the legislation are offered.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel James G. Hulsey, Jr. (M.S. Mathematics, Clemson University) is a Marine artillery officer. In addition to a variety of assignments in his specialty, he has served as the Marine Officer Instructor at the Naval ROTC at the University of Wisconsin and as a staff officer at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. He was assigned the "joint specialty", having attended the Armed Forces Staff College and served a joint tour as Assistant Naval Attache to Italy. While attending the Air War College class of 1989, Lieutenant Colonel Hulsey participated in the joint warfighting curriculum which was developed as a result of the 1986 Reorganization Act.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Operation "Urgent Fury", the invasion of Grenada in October 1983, was a brilliant military and political success. Politically, it demonstrated U.S. resolve to protect its citizens and to assist its Caribbean neighbors when called upon. Militarily, with little more than 48 hours to plan and coordinate the operation, all major objectives were rapidly accomplished:

- Over 700 U.S. and foreign nationals were evacuated without injury.
- Civil order was restored and legitimate Grenadian governmental officials resumed control of the island.
- All enemy units (Cuban and Grenadian) were neutralized.

Despite the success of Urgent Fury, there was a steady stream of criticism from many sectors concerning the conduct of the operation. Valid or invalid, the criticisms left a perception of serious organizational problems within the Department of Defense(DoD). In discussing the Grenada operation before the Senate on 2 October 1985, Senator Sam Nunn said: "In sum, reports and analyses conducted after the invasion reveal a woeful lack of inter-Service coordination in planning the

operation...Furthermore, the Services demonstrated a remarkable lack of knowledge about how each other operates." (21:15)

Later, he went on to say: "A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the conclusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the performance of the individual troops who fought bravely, the U.S. armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations. We were lucky in Grenada; we may not be so fortunate the next time." (21:15)

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Senator Nunn's conclusions, this perception of interoperability problems in Grenada gave added fuel to military reformists who had long been seeking reform in the defense establishment. Such strong statements from Senator Nunn and others added to the anxiety of the Congress and the American people concerning the ability of the U.S. military to successfully perform its mission. This anxiety had been building from a series of problems widely discussed for several years; principally: unity of command problems in Vietnam; failure to rescue American prisoners of war in the Sontay raid; the failure at Desert One; command and control problems in Lebanon; and alleged poor quality of military advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

It can be argued that Grenada was "the straw that broke the camel's back", and convinced Congress to step in and solve the problems - real or imagined - that DoD could not, or would not, solve itself. In remarks before the Senate on 2 October 1985, Senator Barry Goldwater stated: "The inability of the military

Services to work together effectively has not gone unnoticed...As someone who has devoted his entire life to the military, I am saddened that the Services are still unable to put national interests above parochial interests." (21:12)

Impassioned statements such as these, and those made by Senator Nunn, certainly added impetus to the feeling in Congress that something must be done to correct existing organizational problems in the Defense Department. This movement in the Congress resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

I will examine the major events leading to the passing of this act, using the Grenada operation as a case study, and then examine the act itself. The focus of the examination of the act will be on its effect on the warfighting ability of our armed forces. Will the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 lead to a more efficient, better coordinated force on the battlefield? In discussing their need for changes, Senator Goldwater said: "If we have to fight tomorrow, these problems will cause Americans to die unnecessarily. Even more, they may cause us to lose the fight." (21:4) This is the heart of the matter, and the intent of the legislation is to improve our warfighting capability. Let's see if it moves us in that direction.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since World War II, the question of how this nation's defense establishment should be organized and administered has been widely debated and studied. The National Security Act of 1947 established an organizational framework designed to provide for the "strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." Experiences in World War II had clearly demonstrated the need for greater service cooperation and clear lines of operational command. The 1947 act provided for the establishment of unified commands in strategic areas, but it was sufficiently general to allow for the preservation of individual service autonomy and interests, often to the detriment of joint interests. The unified commands that were established reported to a designated chief of service.

The act was amended in 1949 to create the position of a military Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and clarify the role of the JCS and the Joint Staff. President Eisenhower, in 1953, made several additional changes by executive order. His primary concern was, again, that the organizational structure was not conducive to efficient joint planning for war. He strengthened the position of the unified commanders by giving them the responsibility for the conduct of

operations and having them report directly to a designated military department (Secretary of Army, Navy, or Air Force) rather than through a service chief.(5)

President Eisenhower soon realized he had not gone far enough in defining the role of the unified commander, so in 1958, he made recommendations to the Congress for further changes in the Defense Department. In his message to Congress explaining why he felt changes were necessary, he stated:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service.(6:295)

President Eisenhower's recommendations were approved and the National Security Act was again amended. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958:

- Removed the secretaries of the military departments from the chain of command.
- Removed command authority of the service chiefs over their forces.
- Insured JCS could act only under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of Defense.
- Gave CJCS a vote in deliberations.
- Transferred control of the Joint Staff from the JCS as a whole to the Chairman.
- Organized the JCS staff into numbered directorates as a conventional military staff.
- Increased the size of the Joint Staff from 210 to 400 officers. (2:139)

Unfortunately, the issue of Service interests over defense interests continued to be cited as a problem. We can find this issue cited over and over again. A few examples:

The Symington Report, 1960:

The predominance of Service influence in the formulation of defense planning and the performance of military missions must be corrected...In short, there is a clear need for defense interests rather than particular Service interests.

The Steadman Report, 1978:

The nature of the (JCS) organization virtually precludes effective addressal of those issues involving allocation of resources among the Services, such as budget levels, force structures, and procurement of new weapons systems - except to agree that they should be increased without consideration of resource restraints.

The CJCS Special Study Group, 1982:

A certain amount of Service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the Services too much and the nation's defenses too little. (6:293)

We see this theme repeated in virtually every critical study of the Defense Department since World War II. In discussing failed operational opportunities--Vietnam, Desert One, etc.--military reformists invariably return to President Eisenhower's basic premise that future wars will be fought jointly. This being the case, they say, the military must improve interoperability at all levels.

The role of the JCS and the Service Chiefs has been a central point in the continuing controversy. The "dual hatting" of Services Chiefs as members of JCS placed them in a position

of being torn between representing their Service's interest and simultaneously representing a non-parochial view in the joint arena. This is difficult at best.

In 1982, Air Force General David C. Jones, then Chairman of the JCS, reopened the issue of DoD organization. He advocated the following changes:

- Strengthen the role of the Chairman. The Chairman of the JCS should be the principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense.
- Limit Service staff involvement in the joint process. In matters involving more than one Service, the Joint Staff alone - without the various Service staffs - should provide advice.
- Broaden the training, experience, and rewards for joint duty. More officers should have more tours of duty in joint assignments more often in their careers, and should be rewarded for doing so. (2:139)

The Army Chief of Staff at the time, General Edward C. Meyer, reinforced General Jones' recommendations by advocating the following:

- Eliminating "dual hatting" the Service Chiefs as members of the JCS and replacing them with a group of military advisors who have no further Service responsibilities.
- Increasing the role of the unified commanders in resources determination and allocation and in the development of contingency plans.
- Decreasing the role of civilians below the level of Secretary of Defense in providing military input on national security issues. (2:140)

The remarks by Generals Jones and Meyer rekindled the issue of problems in DoD organization and caused the Congress to

initiate yet another investigation to look into the matter. Though the investigation did not result in legislation to restructure DoD, the seed had been planted, or replanted, in the minds of many influential Congressmen. These Congressmen were apparently convinced problems existed but were not yet convinced to step in and solve the problems for DoD.

THE COMMON THREAD

In reviewing the debate since World War II, we consistently find a recurring theme--DoD must be better organized to subjugate the needs of the individual Services to those of the operational, warfighting commands, in order to fight and win as a joint sea, air, land team. This trend toward increased "jointness" has been steadily building since the creation of DoD.

This is the climate in which we embarked upon the Grenada operation. I wish to examine that operation to see what problems occurred, how those problems were viewed by the Congress and others, and how the events following the operation led to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

CHAPTER III

OPERATION URGENT FURY

PURPOSE

My purpose in the examination of Operation Urgent Fury will be to determine how the execution of the operation was perceived, after the fact, in light of the organizational concerns discussed in the previous chapter. For my purposes, the validity of the criticisms of the operation is not as important as the perceptions left as a result of the criticisms. I will not, therefore, attempt to defend, from a military standpoint, the actions taken in Grenada.

BACKGROUND

Serious concern for the safety of Americans in Grenada began on 13 October 1983 when Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's government fell in a coup led by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. On 17 October, JCS was directed to begin planning for the conduct of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in the event rescue of American citizens on the island became necessary. On 19 October, when Prime Minister Bishop and some of his supporters were executed, planning continued in earnest.

The decision to expand from a noncombatant operation to an operation to seize control of the island came on 22 October, after officials of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) requested United States assistance in a military operation to restore order on Grenada. (1:74)

Admiral Wesley McDonald, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Forces (CINCLANT), received the word to expand the operation to a full-scale assault late on 22 October (7:8). He was directed to commence the operation no later than 25 October, giving him less than 48 hours to plan and initiate the operation. The operation was to accomplish the following:

First, to secure and evacuate American citizens, and certain other foreign nationals, in order to ensure their safety.

Second, to neutralize the Grenadian military and any other armed force on the island that might threaten the evacuation process.

Third, to restore order, stability and democracy to Grenada, under the terms of the 1981 OECS treaty. (7:8)

When Admiral Joseph Metcalf III was notified he would command the joint task force conducting the operation, he had 39 hours to assemble the force and commence operations. (11:282)

THE PLAN

The plan called for a joint operation involving forces from all four Services. Navy SEALs and Army special operations

forces would go ashore on the night of 24 October for selected offensive operations and reconnaissance purposes, and the main assault would commence on the morning of 25 October. Marines from the Marine Amphibious Unit 22 (22MAU) would conduct helicopter and surface assaults on the island's northeast coast to secure Pearls Airport and the northern end of the island. Simultaneously, Army Rangers were to conduct an airborne or air-land assault on the southern end of the island to secure the Point Salines airfield for use by follow-on Army forces, who would land by Air Force transports. This follow-on force was to then secure the southern half of the island, evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals desiring evacuation, and aid the Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces (made up of forces from the other members of the OECS) in turning over control of the island to competent and legal Grenadian authorities. Close air support was to be provided by Navy and Air Force fixed-wing assets and Marine gunships. If things went as planned, the operation was expected to last approximately 24 hours. (7:13)

EXECUTION OVERVIEW

The SEALs went ashore as planned and found that the beach designated for surface assault by the Marines was completely unsuitable for landing operations. The plan was altered and the Marines conducted the scheduled helicopter assaults in their sector commencing at 0500. Resistance on the northern end of

the island was relatively light and Marine objectives, including Pearls airfield, were secured early on D-Day, 25 October.

On the southern end of the island, however, things were not going so smoothly. Heavier than expected resistance was met, and the 1st Army Ranger Battalion was unable to quickly secure the Point Salines airport complex as planned. Though the enemy continued to fire on the airfield, the Rangers were able, by 0730, to secure the runway sufficiently for C-130's to land carrying the 2nd Ranger Battalion. By 0900, the Rangers were able to move out. They secured the True Blue medical school campus at the end of the Point Salines complex by 1915 on D-Day and freed several hundred medical students. They were to learn, however, that this was not the sole location of American students as prior intelligence had indicated. The Ranger forces then continued their northward advance under heavy enemy resistance.

It was not until 1400 on D-Day that the southern end of the island was sufficiently secure to bring in the Army follow-on forces, elements of the 82d Airborne Division.

Elsewhere on the island, other American forces had also run into trouble. Special operations forces had been sent to neutralize an enemy stronghold at Fort Rupert and to free the Governor General from his residence near the capital of St. Georges. The attack on Fort Rupert bogged down quickly and was subsequently abandoned. The effort to free the Governor General continued through D-Day. Marine reinforcements were sent to the

Governor General's residence to assist the special operations forces early on D+1, at which time the residence was secured and the Governor General freed.

Back on the southern end of the island, the Army Rangers had learned there were additional American students at the Grand Anse campus farther to the north. Heavy fighting continued in the South through D+1, and the students at the Grand Anse campus were finally rescued at approximately 1700 on D+1.

The combat phase of Operation Urgent Fury continued through D+2, primarily on the southern end of the island, as remaining pockets of resistance were neutralized. Mopping up operations continued through 31 October, and official cessation of hostilities was declared on 2 November.

MAJOR CRITICISMS

As I stated earlier, there was a steady stream of criticism of the military performance on Grenada. I will address the major areas of criticism without passing judgement on their validity to see how the perception of military readiness and efficiency may have been affected.

First: The forces assigned were based on each individual Service's desire to participate vice the operational requirement.

In a critical report about the Grenada operation, William S. Lind, a military reformist, wrote:

The Army was anxious to give its Rangers a piece of the action to justify its request for a third Ranger battalion and a Ranger regimental headquarters, while the overall command for specialized, commando-type forces wanted a chance to show what its units could do. So, in what seems to have become the standard JCS approach to military operations, one that turns them into a pie-dividing contest among all the services, we ended up with a plan that allowed the enemy to put up a reasonably good show. (10:49)

Second: Lack of accurate intelligence jeopardized the entire operation.

Senator Nunn pointed out to the Senate that we almost failed to accomplish one of the primary objectives of the operation because we did not know the location of all the American students on the island. Intelligence had indicated all students were at the True Blue medical campus; actually, there were over 200 students at the Grand Anse campus, a fact the Army commander on the scene learned only when the students at Grand Anse called the True Blue campus by phone to request assistance. Since these students were not rescued until late on the second day of the operation, they could easily have been executed if the enemy troops had desired to do so.

The absence of adequate maps at the beginning of the operation has been cited by many sources as a major problem which could have led to disaster. The fact that tourists maps were used in the early stages of planning seemed unbelievable. In an article for the Armed Forces Journal, Benjamin F. Schemmer wrote:

This nation spends billions of dollars for the world's most exotic intelligence collection systems, and we can't distribute a map to men whom we've asked to go to war in a few hours? What good is all of that intelligence in the National Command Center or at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, in Norfolk, VA, if we can't fly a map to an aircraft carrier or transmit one electronically to our ships at sea? (12:52)

Third: There was no unity of command on the island.

Even though there was no question that Admiral Metcalf was in command of all forces involved in the operation, many observers felt there should have been a single commander on the ground. As it was, Admiral Metcalf was aboard the flagship, and there were two commanders on the island - the Army in the south, and the Marines in the north. This point was also made to the Senate.

Fourth: There were serious coordination and interoperability problems between the services.

Everyone has heard the story of the Army officer who used his AT&T calling card to phone his unit headquarters in North Carolina in an effort to coordinate Navy fire support for his unit. Senator Nunn discussed the problem of incompatibility of communications equipment before the Senate. He said: "Their radios were incompatible. One officer from the 82d Airborne Division even went to the flagship, the Guam, and borrowed a Marine radio. But that didn't work because he did not know the Navy codes and procedures." (21:14)

Admiral McDonald, in responding to questioning by the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee stated: "...we have

to really go to school on ourselves on the way we conduct joint exercises." (17:37) He was making the point that many of the communications difficulties experienced in Grenada had been previously identified in joint exercises, but apparently not corrected.

Senator Nunn summed it up for the Senate when he said: "...it is sobering to look at how much went wrong and at how many failures of coordination and communication there were. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened if the opposition on the island had been better armed, organized, or larger." (21:14)

CONCLUSIONS

An examination of these major criticisms shows why, in the historical context developed in the previous chapter, perceptions of organizational problems within DoD were reinforced by our operations in Grenada. It is not hard to understand why influential statesmen, such as Senators Nunn and Goldwater, became convinced of the necessity for Congress to step in and take action. From their perspective, the defense establishment had been repeating the same type of errors, year after year, in operation after operation, not because of lack of sincerity or dedication of its leaders, but because the organizational structure was "broken".

In his well-known speech before the Senate in October 1985, in which he declared the organization "broken", Senator Goldwater said: "The problem is twofold; first there is lack of true unity of command and second, there is inadequate cooperation among U.S. Military Services when called upon to perform joint operations." (21:12)

I will now examine the steps taken to solve the perceived problems.

CHAPTER IV

REORGANIZATION

THE WINDS OF CHANGE

The forces for change "shifted into high gear" after all reports on the Grenada operation were in. Military reformists sharpened their pencils and pressed the attack harder than ever. More importantly, as we saw earlier, influential members of Congress were now ready to study the problem in earnest and make real changes where necessary.

In the Fall of 1983, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the preparation of a comprehensive staff study to examine the issue. That staff study, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change", was published in 1985, and it became the cornerstone for the legislation which followed. The major themes of this study were:

1. Too much emphasis on functions versus missions. The focus on functional areas, such as manpower, research and development, and policy, leads to ineffective integration of Service capabilities along mission lines.

2. A predominance of Service interests over joint interests. Nine major problem areas were cited here:

- inability of JCS to provide useful and timely advice on joint issues.
- weak authority of unified commanders over Service components in their commands.
- imbalance between responsibilities and accountability of unified commanders.
- no unification below unified commander level.
- confusion on role of Service Secretaries.
- inability of JCS system to make meaningful programmatic inputs.
- incompatibility of military equipment.
- general resistance to joint programs.
- Congressional procedures reinforce divisions in DoD.

3. Inter-Service logrolling. This was cited as a practice in which the Services smoothed over conflicts among themselves, without actually resolving the conflicts.

4. Predominance of Programming and Budgeting. Working the system to justify resource requirements dominates DoD organizational activity, leading to insufficient attention to strategic planning, operational matters, and execution of policy decisions.

5. Lack of clarity of strategic goals. The absence of clear DoD-level strategic goals has left a vacuum, which has been filled by individual goals of the various elements within DoD.

6. Insufficient mechanisms for change. The lack of effective mechanisms at DoD-level has denied the department a process of self-correction and self-modification.

7. Inadequate quality of political appointees and joint duty military personnel.

8. An ineffective division of work. Manifestations of this problem are congressional micromanagement of DoD programs and duplication of effort within the military departments.

9. Excessive spans of control and absence of effective hierarchical structures. Major problems are a confused operational chain of command and unnecessary staff layers within the management headquarters in DoD.

10. Insufficient power and influence of the Secretary of Defense. This lack of real power resulted in limited mission integration of the overall defense effort. (21:58)

The other major study on defense organization was conducted by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission (Packard Commission) on Defense Management. This panel was formed in June 1985 under the leadership of a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard. The commission's final report was presented on 30 June 1986 and contained the following recommendations concerning military organization and command:

1. Designate the CJCS as the principal uniformed military to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

2. Place the Joint Staff and the organization of the JCS under the executive direction of the CJCS.

3. Commands to and reports from the CINCs of the unified and specified commands should be channeled through the CJCS.

4. The Service Chiefs should continue as members of JCS.

5. A four-star position of Vice Chairman of the JCS should be established.

6. The Secretary of Defense should determine procedures for designation of acting CJCS in the absence of the Chairman.

7. Unified Commanders should be given broader authority to structure subordinate commands, joint task forces, and support activities.

8. The Unified Command Plan should be modified to give more flexibility in dealing with situations overlapping boundaries of current unified commands.

9. The Secretary of Defense should have the flexibility to establish the shortest possible chains of command for contingencies short of war.

10. A single unified transportation command should be formed. (19:xx)

The wheels were now in motion and there was no longer a question of if the organizational structure of DoD would be changed. The only remaining questions were how it was to be changed and when the changes would occur.

The President got the ball rolling by signing National Security Decision Directive 219, fully endorsing the recommendations of the Packard Commission concerning military organization and command, and urging Congress to change any laws necessary to implement the recommendations.

REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

All the efforts to reorganize the defense establishment came to fruition in the 99th Congress. The legislation worked its way through the House and Senate and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was signed by President Reagan on 1 October. (2:143) It is instructive to examine Congress' stated intentions in enacting this legislation:

- (1) To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
- (2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
- (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
- (4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
- (5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
- (6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
- (7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
- (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense. (2:143)

To achieve those intentions, the major changes resulting from the legislation are:

- CJCS is principal military advisor. Other chiefs' ideas presented by him.
- CJCS has direct role in providing strategic direction of the armed forces.

- CJCS recommends changes to service roles and missions.
- CJCS is a member of National Security Council.
- Vice Chairman is senior to each Service Chief. Acts as Chairman when he's absent.
- Joint Staff is responsible to . . .
- Joint Staff responsible for joint doctrine.
- Joint officer career specialty established.
- Joint duty made mandatory prerequisite for many flag billets.
- CINCs of unified commands given authority in operations, training, and logistics. CINCs have authority over selection of subordinates and can prescribe subordinate's chain of command. CINCs given administration and support authority over subordinates.
- CINCs have budget for designated activities.
- Ten percent reduction in management headquarters personnel.
- All military forces assigned to a combatant commander. Service Chiefs have no operational authority.(2:144)

Examination of the stated intentions and provisions of the Act reveals two central issues embodied in the legislation - increased power and responsibility of the CJCS and increased authority for the CINCs of the combatant commands. Both of these are clearly consistent with the ideas expressed by President Eisenhower in 1958.

In addition to having a much stronger role as the principal military advisor to higher authority, the CJCS now has singular authority and direction of the Joint Staff. His role is now

much greater in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to help ensure resources are appropriately applied to achieve conformance with the overall priorities set by the Secretary of Defense and the President. The legislation makes it clear the CJCS is now responsible for developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces. This is a vital new function which may have the most direct impact on the warfighting capability of the combatant commands. In the following chapter, I will examine steps taken by the current CJCS to carry out this new responsibility.

To incorporate a mechanism for change within DoD, the CJCS is now required to submit a report, at least every three years, on the roles and missions assigned to the elements of the Department. This report is to contain recommendations for changes necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. This is also a significant step since Service roles and missions have changed little since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

The role of the CINCs of combatant commands has been clarified and their authority greatly increased. The CINC's authority over assigned forces has been expanded to include all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.

The operational chain of command goes directly from the CINCs to the Secretary of Defense to the President. It has been reiterated that the Service Chiefs have no operational authority. The results are consistent with Congressional intent to give the CINCs authority commensurate with their responsibility to allow them to organize and train their commands to fight in a fully coordinated, joint manner.

JOINT SPECIALTY

To ensure the CJCS and the CINCs have qualified officers for their staffs, the legislation provided for the creation of the "joint specialty" for officers with specified training and experience in joint planning and operations. Provisions included necessary controls to ensure officers chosen for the joint specialty are properly qualified and appropriately awarded for joint duty, commensurate with other officers of their Service. These controls were considered necessary because of a perception that the Services consistently assigned lesser qualified officers to joint duty assignments. The inclusion of specific management guidelines for officers with this joint designation is a significant departure from past practice in which the Services exclusively managed the career progression of their officers. Congress has taken this step to create a highly qualified Joint Staff, properly educated and trained in all aspects of joint warfare.

CHAPTER V

WARFIGHTING IMPACTS

Having looked at the historical evolution of events that led to the Reorganization Act of 1986, and at the major provisions of the Act itself, what can we infer about the effects on the future warfighting ability of our armed forces? Will there really be a difference, or is this just another bureaucratic change that will be administratively handled by the management headquarters within DoD, with minimal impact on our combat capability? Since the legislation was enacted, much has been done organizationally to realign functions to comply with the law. Will the DoD return to business as usual once these organizational changes are complete? I think not. Certainly, all the objectives of the legislation will not be fully achieved, and many substantive changes will only occur over time; but real changes are occurring that are much more than cosmetic in nature.

I will now examine some of those changes.

THE JOINT STAFF

We have seen one of the major impacts of the new legislation is increased authority and responsibility of the

CJCS. The current CJCS has used this new authority to reorganize the Joint Staff to better enable him to carry out his increased responsibility. Realizing that one of the major concerns of Congress centered around interoperability issues, he created a new directorate to act as the focal point for interoperability with responsibility for joint doctrine, joint exercises, and operational plans. This new directorate is J-7, the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability. This is perhaps the single most significant addition to the Joint Staff with the potential to bring about meaningful results in joint warfighting.

THE J-7

Prior to the formation of J-7, there was no single agency with the overall responsibility for coordinating the development of doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the armed forces. There was no standardized process for initiation, development, coordination, approval, distribution, or evaluation of joint doctrine. Doctrine was being developed by the Services and/or the Joint Staff, often without the participation of the unified and specified commands. There was no clear distinction between joint doctrine and multi-service doctrine and no firm requirement for consistency between joint, service, and combined doctrine. The joint doctrine that was developed was not always what the combatant commands wanted or needed. (13) Is it any

wonder we had problems conducting joint operations?

JCS publication 2, the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), published in December 1986, sets the new ground rules for the development of joint doctrine. It specifies:

- The CJCS has overall responsibility for joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTP).
- All joint doctrine will be coordinated with the Services, unified and specified commands, and the Joint Staff.
- All joint doctrine will be approved by the CJCS.
- All joint doctrine and JTTP will be published as a distinct family of JCS publications.
- Each Service will ensure that its doctrine and procedures are consistent with joint doctrine established by the CJCS. (9)

The J-7 was formed in early 1987, and its mission statement is very straightforward: "Integrate operational plans and requirements with military strategy to improve national warfighting capability." (13) This directorate is now the interoperability standard bearer, dedicated to providing a framework to correct past failures. The development of joint doctrine and JTTP was considered sufficiently important to establish a separate Joint Doctrine Center (JDC) under J-7 to spearhead that effort. The JDC was formed in Norfolk, Virginia, and has accomplished a great deal in its first year of existence. The JDC and the J-7 have developed the Joint Doctrine Master Plan, to establish a framework for the identification of key doctrinal voids, and initiated projects to create, validate, document, and distribute approved doctrine

to fill these voids. The Master Plan defines a new Joint Doctrine Development Process (JDDP), which incorporates the policies spelled out in the UNAAF. With the input and full participation of the combatant commands and the Services, the JDC has begun several projects to develop doctrine in selected areas. Some examples:

- National Defense Doctrine.
- Intelligence Support of Joint Operations.
- Joint Operations.
- Logistics Support of Joint Operations.
- Joint Planning.
- C3 Systems support of Joint Operations.
- Low Intensity Conflict.
- Special Operations.
- Interdiction.
- Joint Task Force Planning.
- Campaign Planning.(13)

The initial efforts of the J-7 and the JDC are encouraging, not only because the emphasis is on warfighting issues, but also because there is an enthusiasm for finding real solutions to real problems. There is a new sense of direction and cooperation among those involved in the JDDP. The potential for significant direct impact on our nation's warfighting capability is tremendous.

THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (JROC)

Performing an oversight role to ensure jointness and interoperability are interwoven at the highest levels of Pentagon planning, is the JROC. The JROC grew out of what was previously the Joint Requirements and Management Board, which

had been formed in 1983 to oversee acquisition programs. In 1987, the functions of the board were expanded to accommodate changes dictated in the Reorganization Act. The JROC is made up of the vice chiefs of the Services and chaired by the newly created Vice Chairman of the JCS. Vice Chairman, General Robert Herres, describes the role of the JROC as: "...the central thread of continuity in weaving jointness and interoperability into everything we do on a daily basis but, in particular, in making that connection from requirements to the implementation process." (8:22) Since General Herres believes: "The emphasis is on fulfilling the requirements of the commanders-in-chief...", (8:22) the JROC provides a much needed connection between the CINCs, as the identifiers of requirements, and the acquisition cycle.

Once again, we see the emphasis on making things better for the warfighting CINCs.

THE WARFIGHTING CINCS

With the increased authority of the CINCs, they are now in a unique position to make a real difference in this nation's warfighting capability. Not only do they have the authority to organize and train their commands as they deem necessary, they also now have a much stronger voice in the application of defense resources. The Congress has made it clear that all efforts of DoD should be geared to ultimately support the

warfighters. The views of the CINCs, therefore, will likely be the deciding factor on many major acquisition decisions in the future. This will be especially critical in this time of scarcer resources and leaner force structures.

The new clout of the CINCs enables them to concentrate on their primary mission of planning and training for war, without undue influence or interference from the Services. The operational chain of command is clear, and the needs of the CINCs have number one priority in the eyes of Congress.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a strong statement by the Congress (and the American people) that they expect some fundamental changes in the organization and performance of this country's armed forces. The congress had obviously lost its confidence in the ability of the Department of Defense to make needed organizational changes to correct perceived serious operational deficiencies. Greater cooperation, coordination, and interoperability amongst the Services to enhance joint warfighting capabilities is the clear mandate from the Congress. Expectations for greatly improved performance as a result of the legislation is high. Representative Bill Nichols (D-Alabama), then Chairman of the Investigations Committee which worked the reorganization bill said:

The legislation fulfils the aims of President Eisenhower, who said almost three decades ago, 'Separate ground, sea, and air warfare are gone forever...(previously quoted)', Congress rejected President Eisenhower's appeals in the 1950's. Today, 36 years later, we can now report: Mission Accomplished. (18)

Perhaps that assessment is a bit optimistic, but the legislation went a long way in curing the ills perceived by Congress.

Congress has demonstrated its willingness to step in and legislate change when they feel it necessary, and they are by no means going to step out of the picture now. There have already been other legislated changes since the 1986 Reorganization Act. The 1987 DoD Appropriations Act, for example, provided for the creation of two additional unified commands, the Special Operations Command and the Transportation Command. (14:89) I will not examine those commands here, but their creation grew from the same Congressional concerns that led to the Reorganization Act. The lesson here is that DoD must regain the confidence of Congress to put the business of national defense back in the proper hands.

Are we better organized and prepared to provide for the national defense as a result of the 1986 legislation? I think so. Certainly, the post-reorganization environment is different. The current Vice Chairman of the JCS, General Herres, said: "No one can intelligently argue any longer that jointness is not the most effective way to operate our military." (8:25) "Jointness" is definitely in. The CJCS has a formidable challenge ahead, and, to a great degree, the success or failure of the reorganization rests with his ability to satisfactorily produce results. He has responded decisively to the new legislation by reorganizing the Joint Staff to address joint warfighting issues in a well-defined, more responsive way. Agencies and procedures are now in place to deal with all facets of Service interoperability. The new J-7 directorate, as

the focal point of the integrated effort, will be a key player in helping to accomplish the goals of the reorganization legislation.

The needs of the warfighting CINCs are receiving higher priority and the CINCs themselves have a much stronger voice in determining the overall needs of the defense establishment. They now have command of the forces assigned to their commands - the type of command envisioned by President Eisenhower in 1958.

The biggest change in the post-reorganization environment is one of attitude. Joint warfighting is unquestionably "on the front burner." The process of identifying, training, and educating officers for the joint specialty is well under way, with major curriculum modifications in the major Service schools. Service roles and missions are being seriously examined for the first time in many years. Questions such as "Should the Army take over the close air support role from the Air Force?" are being vigorously debated and studied. This type of critical dialogue is healthy and should continue.

Looking back at the perceptions left by problems in Grenada and elsewhere, we see that the major problem areas identified in the past have been addressed, directly or indirectly, in the reorganization legislation. The military forces of this country are organizationally better prepared to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. The real challenge is to ensure that the intent of the legislation is realized, and that the processes now in place not only solve past problems, but also

Identify needed change to successfully address and solve the problems of the future.

CHAPTER VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is much to be accomplished to fully achieve the goals of the reorganization legislation. The maximum benefits can only be realized with the full acceptance and cooperation of the entire defense establishment.

CJCS AND THE JOINT STAFF

As we have seen, the success or failure of the reorganization depends largely upon the ability of the CJCS and the Joint Staff to satisfactorily guide the efforts of the military Services. The CJCS has reacted aggressively by reorganizing the Joint Staff to place emphasis on joint and interoperability issues. This initial momentum must be maintained by constant reinforcement of the JCS commitment to addressing and solving joint issues.

The new legislation provided mechanisms for the CJCS to recommend needed changes to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces. It is vital that the CJCS set the tone and lead the way in establishing a continuing program of self-analysis within DoD to determine when and if

changes are required. The CJCS must be courageous in making unpopular decisions and recommendations for change when warranted. His periodic report to the Secretary of Defense on the assignment of roles and missions to the Services must be a hard hitting, non-biased report, unrestrained by "the way we've always done it" thinking. This will go a long way in restoring Congress' confidence in DoD's ability and willingness to overcome the bureaucracy and provide the nation with an effective and efficient military. Until this confidence is restored, Congress will continue to legislate changes they feel are necessary.

The responsibility for providing the best military advice possible to the Secretary of Defense and the President now rests squarely with the CJCS. He must coordinate the efforts of the Service Chiefs and the CINCs of the warfighting commands but the final advice is his. He must be prepared to act decisively to resolve conflicts and reverse the perception of self-serving, Service-oriented, negotiated decision making in the JCS.

THE SERVICES

Hostile as it might appear, the post-reorganization environment presents the Services new opportunities as well as challenges. The Services should fully embrace the changes and strive to achieve the objectives of the legislation. To receive Congressional backing for Service requirements, it will be

critical for these requirements to support national commitments. The Services must be able to establish linkage between their stated requirements and the needs of the warfighting CINCs, and then clearly articulate that linkage. Greater cooperation among the Services will also be required to avoid creating dual capabilities which will be hard to justify in the current joint environment. (15:50)

Service roles and missions are being examined by the Congress and by military reformists as well. It is incumbent on the real experts, the Services themselves, to take a fresh look and do some additional critical analysis, keeping in mind the new realities of increased outside scrutiny and decreasing budgets. The Services must be active players in all facets of the reorganization. If not, they will be constantly reacting to changes dictated by the Congress or the Joint Staff, with no input in the process.

THE CINCS

The CINCs, with their increased authority and responsibility, must remain focused on warfighting issues and ensure their commands are active players in the JDDP. With decreasing budgets ahead, there will be pressure to cut back on training resource requirements. The training requirements of the CINCs will have to be carefully planned and prioritized to ensure the conduct of critical training needed to develop and validate joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

As we have seen, the intent of the 1986 legislation is ultimately focused on increasing the warfighting ability of the combatant commands. The CINCs are in a position to determine if the changes brought on by the legislation are, in fact, doing that. They must be prepared to be the "honest broker" to ensure the efforts of the Services, the JCS, the DoD, and the Congress are effectively contributing to that goal. Their credibility is high and their voices will be heard.

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